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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the majority of circuits and determined that a felony
conviction obtained in an adult court, but served in a juvenile detention facility, qualified as a prior felony conviction under the
career offender guidelines.' In a unanimous decision, the threejudge panel in United States v. Gregory upheld the district court's
decision, finding that a conviction of robbery for the amount of
thirty dollars that the defendant committed when he was only fifteen years old, counted as one of his two predicate convictions,
2
triggering the career-offender sentence enhancement.
The career offender guidelines were created pursuant to a congressional directive with the intent to provide sentences at the
statutory maximum for specifically defined repeat violent and
drug offenders. 3 However, the Sentencing Commission drastically
1. United States v. Gregory, 591 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2010).
2. Gregory, 591 F.3d 964.
3. Amy Baron-Evans, Jennifer Coffin &, Sara Noonan, Deconstructing the Career
Offender Guideline, APR. 25, 2010, FEDERAL DEFENDER, 2 (Apr. 25, 2010),
http://www.fd.org/pdflibDeconstructing/20the%2OCareer%200ffender%2OGuideline%201
.4.2010.pdf.
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departed from this directive, applying severe punishments to a
broad class of offenders not described by Congress, without reason
or careful study, and contrary to the advice of the courts and empirical evidence. 4 Consequently, although the term "career offender" may create the perception of a vicious convict with an extensive criminal background, the guidelines only require two prior
felony convictions of either a drug or violent offense. A person
qualifies as a career offender under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines if:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time
the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2)
the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the
defendant has a least two prior felony convictions of either a
5
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
The third requirement, on its face, seems relatively straightforward. However, interpretation of this requirement has split the
circuits when one or both of the prior convictions occurred while
the defendant was a minor and was sentenced, not to prison, but
6
to a juvenile detention facility.
This paper will begin by analyzing the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Gregory. Next, it will explain how the
other circuits have interpreted United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 4B1.1, the career offender guidelines. After exploring each side of the circuit split, this paper will suggest that a
conviction, occurring when an individual is under the age of eighteen and sentenced to a juvenile detention facility, should not qualify as a prior felony conviction under the career offender guidelines. Then the substantive reasonableness of Gregory's sentence
will be evaluated. Finally, the rule of lenity will be discussed,

4. Id. at 7-8.
5. Gregory, 591 F.3d at 966-67 (citing U.S. SENTENCiNG GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4B1.1(a) (2002)).
6. Id. at 967. The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the location
where individuals serve their sentences is irrelevant. Id. (citing United States v. Moorer,
383 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2004), cert denied, 544 U.S. 1024 (2005); United States v. Carrillo,
991 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Pinion, 4 F.3d 941 (11th Cir. 1993)). In contrast, the Fourth Circuit has held that only sentences served under the state's adult sentencing laws and served in an adult prison fulfills the third requirement of the career offender guidelines. Gregory, 591 F.3d at 967 (citing United States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555
(4th Cir. 2002)).
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which provides the appropriate way of resolving ambiguous criminal statutes.

II. BACKGROUND
In Gregory, the defendant, Isaiah Gregory, was indicted for several drug trafficking offenses, specifically distribution and possession with intent to deliver cocaine and crack cocaine. 7 Approximately twelve months later, Gregory pled guilty to all charges.8
Prior to sentencing, the probation officer prepared a presentence
investigation report, 9 which classified Gregory as a career offender
under United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 4B1.1.' 0 The
presentence investigation report identified two predicate felony
convictions that ultimately laid the foundation for the career offender sentence enhancement imposed in this case.1" The two prior convictions were first, at the age of fifteen, Gregory was
charged with robbery for stealing thirty dollars from an individual
by force, and second, at the age of nineteen, he pled guilty to aggravated discharge of a firearm. 12 For the robbery conviction,
Gregory served less than two years in a juvenile detention facility. 13 The defendant argued that this offense did not qualify as a
prior offense under the career sentencing guidelines because he
was only fifteen years of age at the time of the incident and he was
confined in a juvenile hall instead of an adult prison. 14 In response, the government argued that Gregory was convicted as an
adult, not a juvenile, and his term of imprisonment in a juvenile
facility met the requirement of United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 4B1.2(a)15 because it exceeded one year.16 The gov-

7. Id. at 965.
8. Id.
9. A presentence investigation report is defined as, "[a] probation officer's detailed
account of a convicted defendant's educational, criminal, family, and social background,
conducted at the court's request as an aid in passing sentence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1221 (8th ed. 2004).
10. Gregory, 591 F.3d at 965.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 968.
14. Id. at 965.
15. This section defines terms used in Section 4B1.1. Section 4B1.2(a) reads as follows:
(a)The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that (1)has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another, or
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ernment also argued that individuals under the age of eighteen
who are convicted as adults are included in the criminal history
17
section of the guidelines.
Agreeing with the government, the district court determined
that because Gregory's conviction was handled in the adult division of the criminal court, his age and subsequent sentence to a
juvenile facility was irrelevant. 18 Therefore, the court found that
Gregory was a career offender and computed the applicable guideline range as 262 to 327 months. 19 Gregory was given the maximum sentence of 327 months, more than twenty-seven years in
prison. 20 The district court requested supplemental briefs from
both parties regarding the effect the career offender classification
had on the length of the defendant's sentence. 21 The government
believed that if Gregory was not classified as a career offender the
applicable guideline range would have been 121 to 151 months,
while the defendant argued that the range would have been 120 to
135 months. 22 Consequently, the fact that the defendant was classified as a career offender more than doubled his sentence. 23 Despite the defendant's age of only fifteen years old, the thirty-dollar
charge for robbery, and the sentence in a juvenile detention center, the district court concluded that the high-end sentence of 327
24
months was warranted.
On appeal, the sole issue before the Seventh Circuit was whether the robbery that Gregory committed when he was fifteen years
old counted as a prior felony conviction under the United States
25
Sentencing Guidelines, thereby making him a career offender.
The court recognized the substance of this issue and that it was at
the heart of a circuit split.26 The Fourth Circuit's decision was the
only decision that was analogous to Gregory's argument, while the
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had sided with the govern(2)is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2010).

16.

Gregory, 591 F.3d at 965-66.

17.

Id. at 966 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(d) (2010)).

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Gregory, 591 F.3d at 966.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 967.
Gregory, 591 F.3d at 967.
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ment's contentions.2 7 Acknowledging the circuit split, the Seventh
Circuit judges explained that "[t]he difference of opinion centers
on the question whether, in addition to distinguishing between
adult and juvenile convictions, the [gluidelines also call for distinguishing between adult and juvenile sentences, depending on
whether the sentence is imposed pursuant to the adult or juvenile
criminal code." 28 If the Seventh Circuit concluded that it was appropriate to distinguish between adult and juvenile sentences,
then Gregory would not be deemed a career offender; however, if
the judges decided that the type of sentence Gregory received for
his prior conviction was irrelevant, then he would be considered a
career offender and his prison term would be more than doubled.
The court began its analysis by recognizing the Fourth Circuit's
view in United States v. Mason29 that if an individual is tried in an
adult court, but sentenced to a juvenile facility, it cannot count as
a prior felony under the career offender guidelines because an
adult conviction requires an adult sentence. 30 The Fourth Circuit
explained that the word imprisonment applied only to adult convictions, while the word confinement applied to both juvenile and
adult dispositions. 3 1 The language "sentence of imprisonment" as
used in United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 4A1.2(d)(1)
of the career offender guidelines, refers to offenses committed prior to the age of eighteen. 32 Therefore, according to the Fourth Circuit, confinement in a juvenile detention facility cannot count as a
predicate offense because a sentence of imprisonment only applies
33
under the state's adult sentencing laws.
Next, the Seventh Circuit expressed its dissatisfaction with this
interpretation and noted that the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Cir-

27. Id. The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the location where
individuals serve their sentences is irrelevant. Id. (citing Moorer, 383 F.3d at 167-69; Carrillo,
991 F.2d at 593-94; Pinion,4 F.3d at 943-45). In contrast, the Fourth Circuit has held
that only sentences served under the state's adult sentencing laws and served in an adult
prison fulfills the third requirement of the career offender guidelines. Id. (citing Mason,
284 F.3d at 559-62).
28. Id.
29. 284 F.3d 555.
30. Id. at 562.
31. Gregory, 591 F.3d at 967 (citing Mason, 284 F.3d at 560).
32.

Id.

(citing U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 4A1.2(d)(1) (2010)).

Section

4A1.2(d)(1) reads as follows: "(d) Offenses Committed Prior to Age Eighteen: (1) If the
defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of imprisonment exceeding
one year and one month, add 3 points under § 4Al.1(a) for each such sentence." U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(d) (2010).

33.

Mason, 284 F.3d at 562.
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cuits have not been convinced by this argument either. 34 In United States v. Moorer,35 the Third Circuit based its decision solely on
the definition of a prior felony conviction provided by United
States Sentencing Guidelines Section 4B1.2 and Comment 1 to the
section. 36 The pertinent section of the guidelines defines a prior
felony conviction by an individual less than eighteen years of age
as "[a] conviction for an offense committed prior to age eighteen is
an adult conviction if it is classified as an adult conviction under
the laws of the jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted." 37 Relying on this definition, the judges in the Third Circuit
believed that a prior felony conviction is determined exclusively on
the kind of conviction the defendant had, not the type of sentence
given. 38 Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that a prior felony
conviction included any state conviction that the laws of the state
counted as an adult conviction, regardless of the actual sentence
39
imposed.
Agreeing with the Third Circuit, both the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Carrillo,40 and the Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
Pinion,41 established that the prior felony conviction definition
provided by United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 4B1.2,
Comment 1,required only a determination of the type of conviction the defendant was given. 42 In addition to this argument, the
judges of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits determined that the
minority view of the Fourth Circuit was contrary to the purposes
animating the career offender guidelines. 43 The three judge panel
in United States v. Carrilloexplained that the career criminal offender's punishment is based on the number of past offenses as
well as the seriousness of each crime. 44 When an individual is
deemed a career offender, the sentence is more severe because the
offender has demonstrated an unwillingness to change his behavior or an inability to rehabilitate. 45 Therefore, the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits concluded that if a juvenile later commits two
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Gregory, 591 F.3d at 967.
Moorer, 383 F.3d 164.
Id.
Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1 (2010)).
Id.
Id.
Carrillo,991 F.2d at 594.
Pinion, 4 F.3d at 945.
Gregory, 591 F.3d at 967.
Carrillo,991 F.2d at 594-95; Pinion,4 F.3d at 945.
Carrillo,991 F.2d at 594-95 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2010)).
Id.
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additional crimes, then the goal of rehabilitation has failed and
46
the career offender sentencing enhancement should be applied.
Finally, following the majority position, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the only question of importance is whether the offender was convicted as an adult or juvenile, rendering the sentence imposed irrelevant. 47 The judges explained that "[pleople
served their sentences in many different places: some are moved
to private prisons; some wind up spending time in the facilities of
another state or the federal government; some are lodged in county jails. The location is unimportant. What does matter is the
nature of the underlying conviction." 48 Therefore, the court concluded that Gregory was appropriately classified as a career offender. 49 The judges also determined that the 327-month sentence
was not substantively unreasonable and affirmed the judgment of
50
the district court.
III. INTERPRETING THE CAREER OFFENDER GUIDELINES
The Seventh Circuit, similar to the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits, misinterpreted the career offender guidelines and erroneously applied the career offender sentencing enhancement in
situations involving a prior juvenile sentence. As stated above,
the defendant in Gregory was convicted of robbery when he was
fifteen years old and received a sentence exceeding one year and
one month. 51 This conviction should not have been considered a
predicate offense under the career offender guidelines because
Gregory was less than eighteen years old at the time of his robbery conviction and served his sentence in a juvenile facility.
Section 4A1.2(d) of the sentencing guidelines deals specifically
with offenses committed prior to the age of eighteen. 52 In order for

46. Carrillo,991 F.2d at 594-95; Pinion, 4 F.3d at 945.
47. Gregory, 591 F.3d at 967.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 966. Under Section 4A1.2(d)(1) of the sentencing guidelines, the defendant
must have received a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month in order
for his conviction to qualify as a predicate offense. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(1).
52. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d) reads as follows:
(d) Offenses Committed Prior to Age Eighteen
(1) If the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, add 3 points under § 4Al.1(a) for each such
sentence.
(2)In any other case,

780

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 49

a conviction to count as a predicate offense under Section 4A1.2(d),
the defendant must be convicted as an adult and receive a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, or the
defendant must receive an adult or juvenile sentence to confinement exceeding sixty days and must have participated in the instant offense within five years of his release from confinement of
the prior offense. 53 The ambiguity involving the type of confinement that is necessary to trigger the career offender sentence enhancement is the basis for the circuit split. Essentially, following
an adult conviction, the court must determine whether Section
4A1.2(d)(1) requires a distinction to be made between incarceration in an adult prison and a juvenile facility. The Fourth Circuit
correctly determined that Section 4A1.2(d) does not apply when a
defendant is sentenced to a juvenile facility unless the instant offense occurred within five years of the prior offense. 54 In contrast,
the judges of the Seventh Circuit as well the Third, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have misinterpreted the career offender guidelines, concluding that the type of incarceration imposed is irrele55
vant.
An examination of the Sentencing Commission's commentary
will demonstrate that the majority of circuits have misinterpreted
Section 4A1.2(d) of the career offender guidelines. 56 The commentary to Section 4A1.2(d) is as follows:
Offenses Committed Prior to Age Eighteen. Section 4A1.2(d)
covers offenses committed prior to age eighteen. Attempting
to count every juvenile adjudication would have the potential
for creating large disparities due to different availability of
records. Therefore, for offenses committed prior to age eighteen, only those that resulted in adult sentences of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, or resulted in imposition of an adult or juvenile sentence or release from con(A)
add 2 points under § 4Al.l(b) for each adult or juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty days if the defendant was released from such confinement within five years of his commencement of the instant offense.
(B) add I point under § 4A1.1(c) for each adult or juvenile sentence imposed within
five years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense not covered in (A).
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d).
53. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(1) (emphasis added).
54. Mason, 284 F.3d at 559-62.
55. Moorer, 383 F.3d at 167-69; Carrillo,991 F.2d at 593-94; Pinion,4 F.3d at 943-45.
56. The Sentencing Commission offers commentary in order to help explain the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7 (1998). Also, because the commentary pertaining to Section
4A1.2(d) explains the guideline and is not inconsistent with the guideline, it is considered
binding. See United States v. Souther, 221 F.3d 626 (4th Cir. 2000).
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finement on that sentence within five years of the defendant's
commencement of the instant offense are counted. To avoid
disparities from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the age at which
a defendant is considered a 'juvenile,' this provision applies to
57
all offenses committed prior to age eighteen.
First, it is important to note that the court in Gregory was unable to determine whether more than five years had passed from
Gregory's prior sentence and release from the juvenile facility to
the commencement of the latest offense. Therefore, if Gregory's
conviction is to be counted, it must qualify under Section
4A1.2(d)(1), requiring an adult conviction and a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month. Notice that Section 4A1.2(d)(1) uses the language "sentence of imprisonment"
when referring to an adult conviction. 58 The Sentencing Commission's commentary further explains that "sentence of imprisonment" refers only to an adult sentence of imprisonment. 59 Conversely, under Section 4A1.2(d)(2) the language "sentence to confinement" is used when referring to both juvenile and adult dispositions. 60 When the Commission used the words "imprisonment"
and "confinement" in the guideline, it intended for each word to
have a different connotation. 61 This accords with common legal
word usage: the word "imprisonment" is not typically used when
referring to a juvenile disposition; rather, a less intimidating word
such as "confinement" is customarily used. 62 Thus, Section
4A1.2(d)(1) of the career offender guidelines requires that a defendant receive both an adult conviction and an adult prison sentence exceeding one year and one month in order for it to count as
a predicate offense.
Gregory did not receive an adult prison sentence, but instead he
was sent to a juvenile detention facility. 63 Therefore, applying the
guidelines correctly, Gregory's conviction of robbery for the
amount of thirty dollars when he was only fifteen years old should
not have qualified him as a career offender. The significance of
this error was horrific. The career offender classification more
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
States
63.

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.7 (1998).
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(1).
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.7 (1998).
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2).
Mason, 284 F.3d at 560.
Id. (See also United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151, 155-56 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United
v. Davis, 929 F.2d 930, 933 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Gregory, 591 F.3d at 965, 958.
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than doubled Gregory's applicable guideline range, allowing the
court to sentence him to the maximum penalty of 327 months in
prison.
IV. EVALUATING THE SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS OF
GREGORY'S SENTENCE
Not only did the Seventh Circuit judges misapply the career offender guidelines, but they also failed to find the severe sentence
imposed on Gregory substantially unreasonable. A court must
impose a sentence that is both consistent with the sentencing
guidelines and substantively reasonable. 64 In evaluating the reasonableness of Gregory's sentence, the Seventh Circuit erred when
it relied solely on the predetermined guideline range.6 5 Relying
exclusively on a predetermined guideline range is completely inadequate when an individual's freedom is at stake. It is crucial for
a court to consider the totality of circumstances 66 because the sentencing guidelines are only one factor that a court is required to
consider when determining an appropriate sentence. 67 Evaluating
all relevant factors is especially necessary in cases where the defendant has committed a drug or violent offense. As stated above,
the career offender guidelines were initially based on a congressional directive to provide sentences at the statutory maximum for
68
specifically defined repeat violent and repeat drug offenders.
The Sentencing Commission drastically departed from this directive, applying severe punishments to a broad class of offenders
not described by Congress, without reason or careful study, and
69
contrary to advice of the courts and actual empirical evidence.
Therefore, the sentencing guidelines are far less accurate when
applied to cases involving a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. This inaccuracy, combined with the court's failure

64. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, United States v. Gregory, 591 F.3d (7th Cir. 2009)
(No. 09-2735). (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); United States v. Turner,
569 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2009)).
65. Brief of Defendant, Gregory, 591 F.3d 964 (No. 09-2735). It is important to note
that a court must not automatically presume that just because a sentence falls within the
guideline range that it is to be considered reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
350-51 (2007).
66. Brief of Defendant, Gregory, 591 F.3d 964 (No. 09-2735) (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at
350-51).
67. Id. (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. at 85, 90-91 (2007); Gall, 552 U.S.
at 59).
68. Baron-Evans, supra note 3, at 5-7.
69. Baron-Evans, supra note 3, at 5-7.
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to consider all other relevant factors, led to Gregory's extremely
unreasonable sentence.
A sentence is considered appropriate if it is "sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to achieve the goals of sentencing." 70 In
Gregory, the totality of circumstances should have been considered
to determine such a sentence. For example, with respect to Gregory's first conviction, his age, the amount of money he stole, and
the fact that he served his sentence in a juvenile facility are all
relevant factors that the court did not consider. As a result, the
Seventh Circuit as well as the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
have created a situation where a naive adolescent is later punished excessively for a crime he committed when he was just a
child. Unquestionably, Gregory should be held accountable for the
offenses that he committed as an adult. However, it is extremely
unreasonable to double his sentence based on a thirty dollar robbery conviction that he committed when he was only fifteen years
old.
V. THE RULE OF LENITY
Even though the court erroneously interpreted the statute and
failed to find the sentence unreasonable, the rule of lenity should
have been used to reduce Gregory's sentence. The rule of lenity
requires ambiguous criminal statutes to be interpreted in favor of
the defendant.7 1 The difficulty the circuit courts had interpreting
Section 4A1.2(d) of the career offender guidelines provides clear
evidence of the ambiguity. This rule is especially useful in cases
like Gregory, where a mandatory minimum sentence is at issue,
because an aggressive application of lenity will still result in a
sentence that is close to Congress's sentencing intent:
[A]n interpretation that errs on the side of exclusion (an interpretive error on the side of leniency) still permits the sentencing judge to impose a sentence similar to, perhaps close
to, the statutory sentence even if that sentence (because of the
court's interpretation of the statute) is not legislatively re2
quired.7
Conversely, "an interpretation that errs on the side of inclusion
requires imposing . . . additional imprisonment on individuals
70.
71.
72.

18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2010).
Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1860 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1860 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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73
whom Congress would not have intended to punish so harshly."
As discussed above, the Sentencing Committee did not intend to
double an individual's prison sentence based on a crime committed
when he was only fifteen years old. Therefore, at the very minimum, the rule of lenity should have been used to resolve the ambiguous guideline in Gregory's favor, resulting in a considerably
lower sentence.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit judges misinterpreted Section 4A1.2(d) of
the career offender guidelines, failed to find Gregory's sentence
unreasonable, and failed to use the rule of lenity. If the court
handled just one of these issues correctly, Gregory's sentence
would have been substantially reduced to a fair and accurate punishment. The Seventh Circuit's erroneous decision is especially
disheartening because of the profound effect its decision had on a
young man's life. In addition, Gregory's staggering prison sentence not only defies the United States Sentencing Committee's
intentions, it defies the essence of the entire criminal justice system. The fact that a conviction of robbery for the amount of thirty
dollars that the defendant committed when he was only fifteen
years old added, at the very minimum, nearly fifteen years to
Gregory's sentence seems to undermine the basic principles of
fairness and most importantly, justice. Apparently, the Seventh
Circuit judges did not consider these fundamental principles when
affirming the district court's opinion.
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit ignored the precedent it would
be setting: allowing juvenile sentences to drastically increase later federal sentences will cause profound inconsistencies between
similarly positioned offenders. Juvenile court systems vary greatly from state to state with a substantial amount of discretion given
to the judges to make a decision. This disparity directly conflicts
with the idea of a fairly uniform system that the United States
Sentencing Commission intended to create. Hopefully, the United
States Sentencing Commission will step in and clarify the career
offender guidelines so decisions like Gregory will not persist.
Curt W McMillen

73. Id.

